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No Comment: Will Cariou v. Prince Alter Copyright 
Judges’ Taste in Art?
IntroductIon
Even though copyright law is purportedly designed to promote and protect the arts, often-
times one can detect an uneasy relationship between copyright law and art.  The problems 
arise when the law attempts to “read” art.  Invariably, aesthetic judgments are made and 
judges cross a line that makes the public uncomfortable.  
I have written elsewhere about the extent to which the law makes aesthetic judgments.1 
Though it certainly does, the practice is frowned upon.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s fa-
mous 1903 admonishment still describes conventional wisdom today on judging art: 
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to 
constitute themselves final judges of the worth of [writings, illustrations, mu-
sic and other forms of expression] outside of the narrowest and most obvious 
limits.2 
It is widely thought that viewing art is a profoundly emotional experience.3  If this is true, how 
can we reconcile this with our demand for a dispassionate scrutiny in law?  
It is natural for viewers of art to ask the proverbial question, “Is it art?”  Who has not done 
this at least once?  Viewers may also inquire about what a work of art might be supposed to 
*  Professor, American University Washington College of Law. Please send comments to cfarley@wcl.
american.edu. This essay greatly benefited from the helpful feedback I received at the conference on Lever-
aging Creativity: Artists, Entrepreneurship, and Intellectual Property Law organized by Indiana University 
Maurer School of Law.  I am grateful for the outstanding research assistance I received from Kristin Lockhart.
1.  Christine Haight Farley, Judging Art, 79 tul. l. rev. 805 (2005).
2.  Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (determining whether advertise-
ments could be “art” for purposes of copyright protection).
3.  Dorothy Spears, Heart-Pounding Art, Seen Solo, n.Y. tImes, Oct. 26, 2012, available at http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/arts/artsspecial/arts-emotional-tug-is-best-experienced-alone-a-study-finds.
html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (describing a scientific study that measured the emotional response of museum-
goers).
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“mean.”  Or we may contemplate what the artist is trying to “say.”  These are common ques-
tions that museumgoers, for instance, might ask.  But generally speaking, we would not want 
to go on the record with these questions or with the answers we may produce in response to 
these questions.  We would also be uncomfortable with courts addressing these questions. 
But in art and copyright cases, these very questions may arise.   
In Parks v. LaFace Records,4 a case that pitted Rosa Parks’s common law right of pub-
licity against a band’s use of her name as the title of a rap song, the Sixth Circuit Court 
of Appeals used the phrase “crying artist” not once, but twice.5  What the court implicitly 
meant by using this phrase was that one does not get to claim to be an artist and leave it at 
that.  No bald assertions of art will be accepted.  If a party’s work is art, it must be proved. 
Appropriation art then brings these concerns to the fore.  It may provoke curiosity, hu-
mor, or even frustration.  It may provoke viewers to ask, “Is it art?”  And in disputes be-
tween appropriation artists and the creators or owners of a work appropriated by them, it 
may provoke courts to make aesthetic determinations about the works involved under the 
copyright fair use doctrine.
What is appropriation art?  Definitions of appropriation art abound. Generally, these 
definitions refer to the act of incorporating, with little or no alteration, preexisting images 
or objects sometimes, but not always, as a means of commenting on the society that has 
produced such cultural artifacts. How can there possibly be one accepted definition of ap-
propriation art?  How can the work of so many disparate artists be so easily summed up? Of 
course there is no agreement in the art world on a definition of appropriation art.
As a representative illustration, consider the work of Robert Heinecken, a self-proclaimed 
“para-photographer” who believes his work stands “‘beyond’ traditional ideas associated 
with photography,” even though he has rarely been behind a camera lens.6 Heinecken’s 
work uses images from newspapers, magazines, television, and even pornography.  He 
recontextualizes them through various techniques, including collages and dark room ex-
perimentation.7  In his piece More Than a Million People Like What Lark Does, Heineck-
nen simply layers two facing pages from an issue of the magazine Life.8 One page was an 
advertisement for Lark’s technological advances; the other was the portrait of the “guru” to 
The Beatles and Mia Farrow. The two combined create the piece below:9
4.  Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437 (6th Cir. 2003) (stating that it was “not called upon in this case 
to judge the quality of Defendants’ song, and whether we personally regard it as repulsive trash or a work of 
genius is immaterial to a determination of the legal issues presented to us.”).
5.  Id.
6.  momA Press: exhIbItIons, Robert Heinecken: Object Matter (June 10, 2013), available at http://press.
moma.org/2013/06/robert-heinecken.
7.  Id. 
8.  See lIfe, Feb. 9, 1968, at 51–52, available at http://books.google.com/books?id=K0kEAAAAMBAJ&pr
intsec=frontcover&dq=Life+Magazine+February+9+1968&hl=en&sa=X&ei=UeIRVNyCK4ityASey4LQBg&
ved=0CB8Q6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=Life%20Magazine%20February%209%201968&f=false.
9.  Robert Heinecken, More Than a Million People Like What Lark Does, available at http://www.metmu-
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Works like this are sometimes accused of copyright infringement.10  Because of their reli-
ance on preexisting works, appropriation artists may have to convince courts that their recon-
textualization amounts to a fair use under the law.   
I. fAIr use trAnsformed
When faced with copyright fair use claims by appropriation artists, judges often go in 
search of artistic speech in the works in order to make legal determinations.  That is, courts 
have sought to interpret the message of the original work and the allegedly infringing work to 
determine if the latter work comments on the former.  If the latter work does comment on the 
former, then it will be held to be a fair use and not a copyright infringement.  Commenting is 
one of the preferred fair use activities.  But commenting implies a dialog between the works. 
Under this view, the first work should involve speech and the second work should involve 
speech that responds to the first.
For example, although not an appropriation art case, Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.11 
provides a good illustration of what kind of comment succeeds under fair use law.  Leibovitz 
involved Annie Leibovitz’s famous photograph of a naked and pregnant Demi Moore, which 
seum.org/collection/the-collection-online/search/266189.
10.  Interestingly, a few notable musical artists whose work relies on preexisting copyrighted works, such 
as Christian Marclay and Girl Talk, have thus far not been accused of copyright infringement. Kenneth Gold-
smith, Copyright Is Over – If You Want It, bIllboArd (Jul. 15, 2014 9:05 AM) http://www.billboard.com/biz/
articles/news/legal-and-management/6157548/copyright-is-over-if-you-want-it-guest-post.
11.  Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,137 F.3d 109 (2d Cir. 1998).
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graced the cover of Vanity Fair in August 1991.  The defendant copied the photo to advertise 
the film Naked Gun 33 1/3: The Final Insult.  In doing so, it superimposed Leslie Nielsen’s 
head on a pregnant woman’s naked body in the same pose as Moore.  The Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit found that “[b]ecause the smirking face of Nielsen contrasts so strik-
ingly with the serious expression on the face of Moore, the ad may reasonably be perceived 
as commenting on the seriousness, even the pretentiousness, of the original. The contrast 
achieves the effect of ridicule . . . .”12  Moreover, the court implied that “the undue self-
importance conveyed by the subject of the Leibovitz photograph” was deserving of ridicule.13
Courts searched for comments in defendants’ works before the 1994 Supreme Court deci-
sion in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.,14 and they have continued to do so since then. 
That case involved the rap group 2 Live Crew’s version of the Roy Orbison song Pretty 
Woman.  
Campbell made transformativeness the name of the game in fair use law.15  The Supreme 
Court decision in Campbell incorporated much of Judge Pierre Leval’s commentary on fair 
use and transformativeness. According to Judge Leval, transformative works should be pro-
tected by fair use because their purpose is productive and adds value.16 Quoting Leval, Camp-
bell held that a work is deemed transformative if it does not merely “supersede the objects of 
the original, [but] instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, 
altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message.”17 
The transformative use test has been developed at common law, but the word “transformed” 
appears just once in the copyright act, in the definition of a derivative work.  Section 101 de-
fines a derivative work as a work based on one or more preexisting works in any “form in 
which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted.” 18  Obviously Judge Leval set out to 
contrast transformative works with derivative works, but the distinction often lies in the eye 
of the beholder.19  For instance, Tony Reese has concluded that “in evaluating transforma-
tiveness the courts focus more on the purpose of a defendant’s use than on any alteration the 
12.  Id. at 114.
13.  Id.
14.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
15.  Donald S. Chisum, Tyler T. Ochoa, Shubha Ghosh & Mary LaFrance, understAndIng IntellectuAl 
ProPertY lAw 430 (2d ed. 2011) (“Since the Supreme Court announced the ‘transformative use’ standard in 
Campbell, it has become the central focus in fair use litigation.”). See also Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making 
Sense of Fair Use, 15 lewIs & clArk l. rev. 715 (2011) (finding a high correlation between judicial find-
ings of transformativeness and fair use since the Supreme Court adopted the transformative use paradigm in 
Campbell).
16.  Pierre Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 hArv. l. rev. 1105 (1990).
17.  Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (internal citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
18.  17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
19.  See, e.g., Michael J. Madison, Rewriting Fair Use and the Future of Copyright Reform, 23 cArdozo 
Arts & ent. l.J. 391, 408 (2005) (suggesting that copyright is better understood in terms of how creative 
things are produced, who does the producing, and what is produced).
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defendant has made to the content of the plaintiff’s work.”20  And Matthew Sag has concluded 
that a “creativity shift” makes fair use more likely.21  Creative shift is an asymmetry between 
the works of the plaintiff and the defendant such that one is more creative and the other is 
more informational.22  Putting these two insights together, courts seem to favor defendants 
who have a creative purpose in recasting a pre-existing work.
Parodists often hit this sweet spot, but under the transformative use test, there is now no 
need for defendants to directly react to the preexisting work, so long as their work otherwise 
transforms it.23  As pronounced by the Supreme Court and Judge Leval, the transformative 
use test opens up the possibilities for defendants’ comments: they can now comment directly 
on the preexisting work or they can direct their comments elsewhere, even to society at large. 
But because the test puts the onus on the newness of defendant’s work, courts continue to 
search for and compare the speech in the works of the defendant and the plaintiff.  In order to 
conclude that defendant’s art is new, judges will ascribe a meaning first to the original work 
and then to defendant’s work in order to compare the two.  
Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 24 although a parody case,25 illustrates the 
contrasting meaning approach taken by courts since Campbell.  The court first assigned plain-
tiff’s “Barbie” the meaning of “the ideal American woman” and a “symbol of American girl-
hood” who is “dressed in various outfits, leading glamorous lifestyles and engaged in exciting 
activities.”26  In contrast, the court’s description of defendant Tom Forsythe’s photos of Bar-
bie reads as if it could have come from an art gallery catalogue of the photographer’s work. 
Forsythe’s work features:
[N]ude, and sometimes frazzled looking Barbies in often ridiculous and 
apparently dangerous situations. His lighting, background, props, and 
camera angles all serve to create a context for Mattel’s copyrighted work that 
20.  R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 colum. J.l & Arts 467, 467 
(2008).
21.  Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 ohIo st l.J. 47, 80 (2012) (recognizing that the number of posi-
tive outcomes increase as more favorable factors are added). 
22.  Id. at 84 n.148. 
23.  See discussion, infra, at 28–29.  See generally Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert de-
nied 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013) (finding that appropriation artists’ works do not need to comment on the original’s 
artist’s work). 
24.  Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Productions, 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
25.  Although Mattel offered into evidence a shopping mall survey that indicated that the general public did 
not get any parodic meaning from the photos, the court concluded Forsythe’s photographs parody Barbie and 
everything Mattel’s doll has come to signify.  Id. at 802.  The court addressed the issue of Forsythe’s use of 
Barbie to make a broader critique on society:  “Undoubtedly, one could make similar statements through other 
means about society, gender roles, sexuality, and perhaps even social class. But Barbie, and all the associations 
she has acquired through Mattel’s impressive marketing success, conveys these messages in a particular way 
that is ripe for social comment.” Id. 
26.  Id.
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transform Barbie’s meaning. Forsythe presents the viewer with a different 
set of associations and a different context for this plastic figure. In some of 
Forsythe’s photos, Barbie is about to be destroyed or harmed by domestic life 
in the form of kitchen appliances, yet continues displaying her well known 
smile, disturbingly oblivious to her predicament. As portrayed in some of 
Forsythe’s photographs, the appliances are substantial and overwhelming, 
while Barbie looks defenseless. In other photographs, Forsythe conveys 
a sexualized perspective of Barbie by showing the nude doll in sexually 
suggestive contexts. It is not difficult to see the commentary that Forsythe 
intended or the harm that he perceived in Barbie’s influence on gender roles 
and the position of women in society.27
So while Barbie symbolizes “beauty, wealth, and glamour,”28 Forsythe’s photos, in sharp 
contrast, connote danger, sex, and domestic subordination.   
If the transformative use test is constrained by the need to interpret works in this way, it 
could impose in the law a doctrine that will fossilize our understanding of how art should 
be appreciated.  The transformative use test in and of itself does not impose this constraint. 
Instead, courts may either impose speech on the art in question, or they may let the art speak 
for itself.
II. Jeff koons In court
Post-pop artist Jeff Koons has left his stamp not just on the art world, but also on fair use 
law.  Koons has a reputation for controversy and pushing limits.  Evidencing his critical 
success, the Whitney Museum’s retrospective of Koons, which opened June 27, 2014, was 
the biggest show devoted to a single artist that the Whitney has ever done.  His commercial 
success has long been certain.  His Balloon Dog (Orange) sold for $58.4 million, the highest 
price ever paid for a work by a living artist.29  Perhaps setting a different kind of record in 
the art world, he has had to answer in court for his use of copyrighted works in four separate 
disputes.30  
Of all of the Koons cases, Rogers v. Koons31 best demonstrates the tensions in applying 
copyright law to contemporary art.  In that case, commercial photographer Art Rogers sued 
Koons for copying his photograph, Puppies, which depicted a seated couple holding numer-
27.  Id. 
28.  Id. 
29.  Ingrid Sischy, Jeff Koons Is Back!, vAnItY fAIr, July 2014, available at http://www.vanityfair.com/cul-
ture/2014/07/jeff-koons-whitney-retropective. 
30.  See Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F. 2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. 
denied, 506 U.S. 934 (1992); Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 
1993); United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
31.  Rogers, 960 F. 2d at 301.
25IP THEORY Volume 5:  Issue 1
ous puppies on their laps. Koons sent the photo, which he found on a greeting card, to an art 
studio in Italy with instructions to reproduce it in a sculpture that ultimately became String of 
Puppies. The district court ruled that this was copyright infringement—and not fair use—and 
the Second Circuit affirmed. 
Although this case is discussed as a failed parody case, 32 it is not clear that Koons or his 
lawyers saw it as merely a parody. Instead, their case theory was that there had been an aes-
thetic transformation, not a transformation of the message.  In his certiorari petition to the 
Supreme Court, Koons framed the question presented as whether an artist who transforms a 
prior work may be held liable.33 Koons thus explicitly asked the Court to offer further guid-
ance on the first factor of the fair use test: the purpose and character of defendant’s use.  The 
case occurred two years after Judge Leval’s influential article on fair use but two years before 
the Supreme Court’s Campbell decision.34  
At trial, Koons’s experts testified that the works were radically different aesthetically, but 
these experts neglected to verbalize what the message in each was. Nevertheless, the court 
proceeded to analyze the works in the strict manner with which parodies had come to be 
scrutinized:  
Koons argues that his sculpture is a satire or parody of society at large. He 
insists that ‘String of Puppies’ is a fair social criticism and asserts to support 
that proposition that he belongs to the school of American artists who 
believe the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a 
deterioration in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of which he 
is a member proposes through incorporating these images into works of art 
to comment critically both on the incorporated object and the political and 
economic system that created it.35
Koons’s sculpture did not succeed as a parody.  The court was not able to assign a message to 
Koons’s art that was in reaction to the photo he used.
Two subsequent Southern District of New York cases were similarly decided and relied on 
the same reasoning.  In United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons,36 the court ruled that Koons’s 
Wild Boy and Puppy was an infringement of Odie from the Garfield comic strip.  And in 
Campbell v. Koons,37 the court refused to find that Koons’s Ushering in Banality was a fair 
32.  Darren Hudson Hick, Appropriation and Transformation, 23 fordhAm Intell. ProP. medIA & ent. l.J. 
1155, 1163–64 (2013).
33.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Koons v. Rogers, 960 F.2d 301 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 
934 (1992) (No. 92-297), 1992 WL 12073534, at * i.
34.  One wonders why the Supreme Court was not motivated to hear Rogers v. Koons, which would have 
given it the same opportunity to incorporate Judge Leval’s transformative use test into fair use law.
35.  Rogers, 960 F. 2d at 309.
36.  United Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). 
37.  Campbell v. Koons, No. 91 Civ. 6055(RO), 1993 WL 97381, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 1993)
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use of Barbara Campbell’s photograph Boys with Pig. 
Many commentators attribute Koons’s eventual reversal of fortune thirteen years later in 
Blanch v. Koons38 to the development in fair use law contributed by Campbell.39 Instead, I 
submit that it has more to do with his change in legal strategy.  In Blanch, Koons offered the 
court an “Art History 101” explanation of his work’s meaning—something he was perhaps 
too arrogant to do in previous cases.  In Rogers, Koons had first demeaned Rogers’s work 
as mere data—a completely accurate and literal depiction of two real people holding eight 
puppies. In addition, he had naively asserted that as a massive, vibrant sculpture, his work 
necessarily transformed the small black and white photograph.
In Blanch, he took a different approach.  Explaining his use of Andrea Blanch’s photograph 
Silk Sandals by Gucci in his painting Niagara, Koons makes abundantly clear his artistic in-
tent to offer a new comment: 
By juxtaposing women’s legs against a backdrop of food and landscape  
. . . [I intended] to comment on the ways in which some of our most basic 
appetites—for food, play, and sex—are mediated by popular images. By re-
contextualizing these fragments as I do, I tried to compel the viewer to break 
out of the conventional way of experiencing a particular appetite as mediated 
by mass media.40
So as not to be again criticized for directing his comment too generally at society, Koons 
offered:
I considered [Blanch’s photograph] to be necessary for inclusion in my painting 
. . . . The photograph is typical of a certain style of mass communication . . . . 
I thus comment upon the culture and attitudes promoted and embodied in [the 
magazine]. By using an existing image, I also ensure a certain authenticity or 
veracity that enhances my commentary—it is the difference between quoting 
and paraphrasing—and ensure that the viewer will understand what I am 
38.  Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
39.  See Hick, supra note 34, at 1167–68 (positing that Campbell served as a basis for the framework in 
Blanch v. Koons). See also Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader Response, 
31 colum. J.l. & Arts 445, 452–53 (2008) (describing how Campbell refocused the fair use inquiry, caution-
ing against individual judgments on the artistic merit of the challenged work); Kim J. Landsman, Does Cariou 
v. Prince Represent the Apogee or Burn-Out of Transformativeness in Fair Use Jurisprudence?: A Plea for a 
Neo-Traditional Approach, 24 fordhAm Intell. ProP. medIA & ent. l.J. 321, 337 (2014) (discussing how the 
analysis in Blanch echoed Campbell); Donn Zaretsky, Koons Wins, Art l. blog (Oct. 30, 2006, 11:05 AM), 
http://theartlawblog.blogspot.com/2006/10/koons-wins.html (noting how the standard for determining whether 
a use is transformative in Blanch was taken from the Court’s analysis in Campbell).
40.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 247 (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Koons Aff. ¶ 10, 
June 10, 2005).
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referring to.41  
Koons’s explanation of his artistic purpose responded to the court’s appetite for imposing 
meaning.  The court was thus able to compare and contrast the two works’ assigned meanings. 
The court found that: 
[Koons’s] purposes in using Blanch’s image are sharply different from 
Blanch’s goals in creating it. Compare Koons Aff. at 4 (“I want the viewer 
to think about his/her personal experience with these objects, products, and 
images and at the same time gain new insight into how these affect our lives.”) 
with Blanch Dep. at 112–113 (“I wanted to show some sort of erotic sense[;]  
. . . to get . . . more of a sexuality to the photographs.”).42  
The court incorporated these “sharply different” creative purposes into the Campbell test: 
Koons is . . . using Blanch’s image as fodder for his commentary on the social 
and aesthetic consequences of mass media. His stated objective is thus not to 
repackage Blanch’s ‘Silk Sandals,’ but to employ it ‘in the creation of new 
information, new aesthetics, new insights and understandings.’ 43  
The court’s ability to understand Koons’s comment was what allowed it to appreciate its 
newness. 
It is remarkable that the courts in Rogers and Blanch reached such different conclusions. 
These cases had much in common: Koons was represented by the same lawyer throughout,44 
all of the litigation was in the same circuit, and the plaintiffs in Blanch and Rogers had similar 
profiles as artists.
The key difference, I submit, is not the decision in Campbell in the intervening years, but 
that the court finally “got” Koons’s work.45  In the Rogers decision from the Southern District 
of New York, Judge Charles Haight’s lack of esteem for the artist pervades the opinion. For 
instance, he remarked how Koons’s first career was as a commodities trader and how he hired 
other artists to make his work. After that, the Second Circuit and subsequent Southern Dis-
trict of New York courts repeated that assessment. In contrast, the Second Circuit’s opinion in 
Blanch paints a different portrait of the artist and weaves his testimony into a coherent story 
41.  Blanch, 467 F.3d at 255 (internal citations omitted).
42.  Id. at 252.
43.  Id. at 253.
44.  The attorney who represented Jeff Koons in both the Rogers and Blanch cases was John B. Koegel 
from The Koegel Group, LLP.
45.  Stephen E. Weil, Fair Use and the Visual Arts, or Please Leave Some Room for Robin Hood, 62 ohIo 
st. l.J. 835, 838 (2001) (“That the deadpan and often elusive ironies of post-modernist visual art are also 
parodies may not be quite so clear. Rogers v. Koons, a case in which the court never really got what the artist 
intended, certainly seems a case in point.”).
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of how fair use law enables this kind of creativity by granting to artists access to “raw materi-
als” such as Blanch’s photograph.
Koons may not be the only artist who has realized the importance of explaining his art to 
a court.  In addition to copyright, a few artists have had to defend themselves against claims 
of trademark infringement.  In the Parks v. LaFace Records case mentioned earlier, the court 
had to determine whether a rap song by OutKast was artistically related to its title Rosa Parks, 
since the Rogers v. Grimaldi46 decision only allows the use of a trademark in the title of an 
artistic work when the title is legitimately artistically related to the work.  But how should a 
court of law determine artistic relevancy?  As with the copyright fair use cases, courts might 
scrutinize the content of the allegedly infringing work for meaning. In Parks, plaintiff sup-
plied the court with a “rap dictionary” and a translation of the lyrics of the song.  The court 
then concluded that the song was not in fact at all about Rosa Parks or the selfless strength 
she symbolized.  Instead, the court determined that the song was about nothing more than 
boasting on the part of the band.  Rather than offer a competing account of their work, Out-
Kast argued that no evaluation of the content of the work was necessary since the song’s hook 
contains the line, “Everybody move to the back of the bus,” which is repeated ten times. This 
strategy recalls Koons’s strategy of arguing that a sculpture necessarily transforms a photo-
graph.47  Both arguments allow courts to take a more distanced view of the works and rely 
more on form than on content. Both arguments, however, were rejected.
In the end, the artist got justice. Unfortunately, the price of this legal success may be 
Koons’s reputation for subversion. The doctrinal fit in Blanch is so cozy that his work feels a 
bit staid. It does not push boundaries; it does not outrage judges. His work is no longer illegal 
art, and, if we take him at his word that he has created an entirely new work out of raw mate-
rials, it may not even be properly deemed edgy appropriation art.  Koons likes to talk about 
how much his work has been influenced by Marcel Duchamp and the Dadaists.  I seriously 
doubt that Duchamp would claim that his urinal, Fountain,48 was something that he created 
entirely new from raw materials.  The Dadaists questioned conventional thinking about art; 
they did not seek to explain their art in a way that conformed to convention.  
III. the Cariou v. PrinCe decIsIon
Given this history, the Cariou v. Prince49 case was a revelation.  Similar to Blanch, ap-
propriation artist Richard Prince was sued for copyright infringement by the artist whose 
46.  Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that Ginger Rogers’s rights were not infringed 
by a Fellini film about Italian cabaret stars entitled Ginger and Fred because the title was artistically related to 
the film).
47.  See discussion, supra Part II., at 25–27 (pointing to Koons argument that his sculpture of the puppies 
was transformative simply because it was no longer a black and white photograph). 
48.  Marcel Duchamp, Fountain (1917), available at http://www.tate.org.uk/art/artworks/duchamp-foun-
tain-t07573. 
49.  Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert denied 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
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photographs Prince incorporated into his work.  Prince is often called an appropriation artist. 
According to the Second Circuit, “Prince’s work, going back to the mid-1970s, has involved 
taking photographs and other images that others have produced and incorporating them into 
paintings and collages that he then presents, in a different context, as his own.”50
Prince’s Canal Zone series used photographs by Patrick Cariou from his 2000 book, Yes 
Rasta.  Prince altered those photographs by, among other things, painting “lozenges” over 
their subjects’ facial features, enlarging and tinting the photographs, using only portions of 
some of the images, affixing headshots from Yes Rasta onto other appropriated images, and 
placing them on canvases painted by him.  Nevertheless, the district court held that Prince’s 
work did not constitute fair use of Cariou’s photographs.  Citing Rogers, a pre-Campbell and 
pre-Blanch case, the district court held that defendant’s work must comment on plaintiff’s 
work in order to be transformative.51  
The Second Circuit reversed this ruling.  It could have simply remanded with instructions 
to properly apply the transformative use test, rather than the outdated Rogers parody test.  It 
did not.  Instead, it ruled that twenty-five out of the thirty works at issue were transformative 
as a matter of law.52  
Cariou went well beyond a reversal of the too narrow requirement that fair reuses comment 
on the originals.  The main significance of the holding is that there is no requirement that a 
work make any comment at all in order to be transformative.   
Unlike Koons in Blanch, Prince absolutely refused to offer the court a simple explanation 
of the meaning of his work.  In his deposition, he was asked repeatedly by opposing coun-
sel to define the message in his work.  His response was: “I don’t really have a message.”53 
Prince’s deposition testimony indicates that for him, the very question of an artwork’s mes-
sage was much more nuanced and complicated than it was for his interrogators:
Q. Are you saying that one of the points or one of the messages in the Canal 
Zone paintings was to evoke Cézanne’s bather paintings?
A. I think if in fact there was a message, it was—there was three people, yes, 
specifically Cézanne’s bathers because of the composition, Picasso’s hands 
and feet, and the masks that were on the De Kooning women.54 
50.  Id. at 699. 
51.  Cariou v. Prince, 784 F. Supp. 2d 337, 348–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
52.  Given the court’s reasoning, it is peculiar that the court remanded five works that presented close cases. 
The case recently settled, apparently to Prince’s satisfaction.  See Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal, Cariou 
v. Prince, No. 1:08-cv-11327-DAB (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 2014); Brian Boucher, Landmark Copyright Lawsuit 
Cariou v. Prince is Settled, Art In AmerIcA (Mar. 18, 2014), available at http://www.artinamericamagazine.
com/news-features/news/landmark-copyright-lawsuit-cariou-v-prince-is-settled/.
53.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari at App. 76, Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 
134 S. Ct. 618 (2013) (No. 13-261) 2013 WL 4508637 (quoting from Prince’s deposition).
54.  Id. at app. 78.
30 IP THEORY Volume 5:  Issue 1
When pressed on the message in a work that merely superimposed lozenges and a guitar 
over a Cariou photo, Prince offered: “He’s playing the guitar now, it looks like he’s playing 
the guitar, it looks as if he’s always played the guitar, that’s what my message was.”55  As a 
result, the district court and the Second Circuit were hard-pressed to ascribe any meaning to 
Prince’s work or to contrast his message with Cariou’s.
Moreover, Prince steadfastly refused to conform his art to the particular aesthetic theory of 
which Rogers and Blanch are representative: 
Q. In superimposing these four images over the landscape from Yes Rasta, 
right, were you commenting on any aspects of culture?
A. No. 
Q. Were you trying to create anything with a new meaning or a new message? 
A. No.56
Instead, Prince proffered an alternate aesthetic theory:
I know that that’s not the original intent of the image, but I don’t have 
any—don’t have any really interest in what the original intent is because 
my—because what I do is I completely try to change it into something that’s 
completely different.
Q. And just again, what is your intent, what are you changing it into?
A. To make great artworks that I make people feel good.57
The following similar exchange demonstrates the plaintiff’s counsel’s interest in eliciting 
such testimony as to the artist’s objective:
Q. Right. Is there a message?
A. There certainly is a message.
Q. What is the message?
55.  Id. at App. 51.
56.  Id. at App. 95.
57.  Id. at App. 93.
31IP THEORY Volume 5:  Issue 1
A. The message is to make great art that makes people feel good. That’s my 
message. Now, I know it might not be someone else’s, but I believe that’s also 
the way I’ve always defined art.58
Although a reader might assume that this testimony was elicited by the artist’s own counsel 
to show the artist’s worthy intensions, it was not.  Plaintiff’s counsel, finding this testimony 
to be in such conflict with the Rogers/Koons aesthetic, relied on it to argue that Prince’s work 
was devoid of a transformative message.
This refusal to speak for his artworks would have frustrated the Rogers and Parks courts, and 
perhaps many others.  But the Cariou court held that Prince’s testimony on transformativeness 
was not conclusive since a fair use defendant need not comment on the plaintiff’s work or on 
society, or testify that he is trying to do so.  
Instead of searching for an artistic comment, the court focused on the art itself.  The criti-
cal inquiry is how the works appear to the reasonable observer.  The court therefore focused 
on objective differences between the works and a visibly different aesthetic.  Looking at the 
two works, the court found “drastically different” aesthetic qualities.59  For example, the court 
identified differences in the two works with regard to size, color, and materials.  In addition, 
it noted the contrast between the serene, natural beauty in the Cariou photographs and the 
crude, jarring, hectic, and apocalyptic images created by Prince.60  Thus, the “newness” that 
Judge Leval has insisted on could be gleaned by the “reasonable observer” without any neces-
sary reference to the artists’s intentions.61 
Henceforth, the provocateurs of the art world will not have to sell out as Koons did in 
Blanch.  Judge Haight, in his opinion, described Koons’s art as “commenting upon the com-
monplace.”  Not only was the judge clearly unimpressed with Koons, he was also dismissive 
of appropriation art.  In contrast, the Second Circuit in Cariou accepted one of the central 
tenets of this art form: that placing common images in new contexts can change the way we 
think about them.  And we do not need the artist to tell us how to think about them.  
Essentially, the Cariou court emphasized form over content in its application of the trans-
formative use test.  Form and content are two distinct vocabularies used to describe art and 
art’s value.  Form is the purely visual.  Formal qualities of an artwork include its line, color, 
texture, balance, movement, composition, and light, among other things.  Formal analysis is a 
means for organizing visual information that can be applied to any kind of artwork, from any 
period in history.  The content of a work may be its subject matter, story, information, emo-
tion, humor, or message.  The Cariou court flipped the common primacy of content analysis 
over formal analysis.  
58.  Id. at App. 82–83.
59.   Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706–07 (2d Cir. 2013), cert denied 134 S. Ct. 618 (2013).
60.  Id. at 706. 
61.  Id. at 707. 
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Content is regularly overemphasized because of habit; art audiences tend to interpret an 
artwork’s meaning instinctively without any consciousness, reflection, or critical examina-
tion.  But content is also privileged because we have become more comfortable with that vo-
cabulary than we are with the vocabulary of form.  But in law, fair use and the transformative 
use test risk solidifying this habit into doctrine.  
Lawyers are certainly more verbal than visual.  Rebecca Tushnet has written about “the 
ungovernability of images in copyright” and argues that the law has greater comfort dealing 
with words than it does with pictures.62  The law has a tendency to rely on verbal explanations 
when dealing with the visual.  Depositions, oral arguments, briefs, and opinions translate art 
into words.  
The unexamined practice of converting the visual to textual has created a parody trap for 
visual artists who use preexisting works.  Courts automatically subject all visual artists’ fair 
use claims to the parody test.  Courts do this because of the inability to conceive of a visual 
analog to the textual concept of quotation. Quotation is the archetypical fair use.63  In text, 
quotation involves dissecting critical amounts of information from its origin and reworking 
it into new information.  Koons and Prince incorporate entire works, and they do so because 
a portion of the visual work would be incomprehensible, in terms of both form and content. 
The textual analogy then is not quotation, but parody.  And as we have seen, parody requires 
a content analysis.
Long before any of the cases mentioned herein were decided, Susan Sontag’s forceful es-
say, Against Interpretation, critiqued our modern penchant for interpreting art for its content. 
According to Sontag:
[I]nterpretation amounts to the philistine refusal to leave the work of art alone. 
Real art has the capacity to make us nervous. By reducing the work of art to 
its content and then interpreting that, one tames the work of art. Interpretation 
makes art manageable, conformable.64
Sontag argued that this practice necessarily reduces the pleasure of art and art itself:  “To 
interpret is to impoverish, to deplete the world—in order to set up a shadow world of ‘mean-
ings.’ It is to turn the world into this world.”65  
Sontag denounced interpretation as contrived and disingenuous.66  The interpretations pro-
nounced in successful fair use cases illustrate and support this critique.  In Campbell, the 
Court assigned the following interpretation to the rap song that 2 Live Crew had themselves 
62.  Rebecca Tushnet, Worth A Thousand Words: The Images of Copyright, 125 hArv. l. rev. 683, 687-89 
(2012).
63.  See lAwrence lessIg, remIx: mAkIng Art And commerce thrIve In the hYbrId economY 52 (2008). 
64.  Susan Sontag, Against Interpretation, in AgAInst InterPretAtIon And other essAYs 8 (1966).
65.  Id. at 7 (emphasis omitted). 
66.  See id. at 12–14. 
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formerly thought of as a cover:
2 Live Crew juxtaposes the romantic musings of a man whose fantasy comes 
true, with degrading taunts, a bawdy demand for sex, and a sigh of relief from 
paternal responsibility. The later words can be taken as a comment on the na-
iveté of the original of an earlier day, as a rejection of its sentiment that ignores 
the ugliness of street life and the debasement that it signifies.67 
Such an interpretation takes some work.  Similarly, the ad for the silly movie in Leibovitz, 
the objective of which was to grab attention and be funny, was interpreted by the court as ridi-
culing the pretensions of Leibovitz’s photograph and its claim to direct iconographic lineage 
to Botticelli’s Birth of Venus through the use of the “Venus Pudica” pose.68  These post-hoc 
explanations of defendants’ messages are better tributes to the skill of the lawyers and judges 
than the artists. 
conclusIon
Cariou’s certiorari petition to the Supreme Court framed the question presented in the case 
as whether fair use: 
[R]equires consideration of the secondary user’s purpose (i.e., his or her jus-
tification for appropriating particular copyrighted materials), and not just of 
the secondary work’s expressive character, as perceived by judges employing 
their own personal aesthetic sensibilities.69 
Cariou thus presents the choice of crediting either the artist’s stated message or the judge’s 
perception of aesthetic value. The latter choice suggests subjectivity and conjures the “dan-
gerous undertaking” proscribed by Holmes.  But as this essay has hopefully illustrated, the 
first choice also involves a subjective, aesthetic interpretation.
The major significance of Cariou for fair use law is that the holding frees courts from the 
activity of assigning interpretations to works of art in order to determine whether or not they 
offer a new comment.  This practice is borne not from anything required by fair use doctrine, 
but from a tendency to verbalize meaning rather than describe difference in form.  Perhaps 
the reason that courts have shied away from this approach is that it is outside of their comfort 
zones.  Instead, the Cariou approach involved explicitly aesthetic discussions.  This is why I 
am skeptical that this important precedent will have much impact on future disputes involving 
contemporary art.
The idea that art has a message comes from a particular aesthetic tradition.  Finding mean-
67.  Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 583 (1994).
68.  See Leibovitz v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,137 F.3d 109, 111 n.1 (2d Cir. 1998). 
69.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 53, at i. 
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ing in art is itself a hotly contested theoretical terrain.  Among many other schools of thought, 
there are intentionalists, who believe the works means what its creator intended; anti-inten-
tionalists who believe that an artist’s intentions are irrelevant; reader-response theorists who 
believe that the audience of a work is actively involved in meaning production; and formal-
ists, who believe that art should be valued not for its meaning, but for its visual aspects. 
Given the great range of thought in art theory, courts should be wary of imposing a particular 
aesthetic tradition on art.  Views may change over time.  We used to think that the minimal art 
of the 60s was to be appreciated for its conceptual qualities.  Now it is more likely appreciated 
for its aesthetic beauty.  What makes art, art has confounded art historians for centuries.  Art 
is indeterminable.  At best, we can conclude that art makes the spectator feel addressed by it 
and therefore bound in a relation with it.
Reminiscent of statements that Prince made in his deposition, Koons revealed in a recent 
interview that:
One of the things that I’m most proud of is making work that lets viewers 
not feel intimidated by art, but feel that they can emotionally participate in it 
through their senses and their intellect and be fully engaged. And feel that they 
can get a foothold in it, to push themselves off of, and lift themselves up on.70
In his deposition, Prince twice stated that his objective was to make great artworks that 
made people happy.  I believe this activity is precisely what the Framers had in mind when in-
cluding the intellectual property clause in the Constitution.  Society is benefitted by an abun-
dance of art that speaks to people, whether or not that art has a definable intended message. 
70.  See Sischy, supra note 31.
